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Abstract The INGO Accountability Charter is the only global, cross-sectoral
regulatory initiative for international NGOs. This is the first independent study of
perceptions of its effectiveness, based upon 26 in-depth semi-structured interviews
with key individuals from 11 leading international NGOs. Firstly, it analyzes
interviewees’ beliefs about the motivations of NGOs in joining the Charter. The
findings contribute to the scholarly debate about the key drivers for voluntary
regulation between ‘club theorists’ and ‘constructivists’ by demonstrating that NGO
behavior in this regard is both self-interested and norm-guided. Secondly, it
investigates the extent to which the interviewees believe that the Charter has been
effective in enhancing the accountability of its members. Their responses further
underline the applicability of club theory and constructivist explanations of NGO
behavior, and lead to several policy recommendations about the future direction of
Charter.
Re´sume´ La Charte des responsabilite´s des organisations non gouvernementales
internationales (ONGI) est la seule initiative re´glementaire intersectorielle mondiale
en vigueur pour les ONG internationales. La pre´sente e´tude des perceptions de son
rendement est la premie`re e´valuation inde´pendante du genre. Elle se fonde sur
26 interviews de´taille´es semi-structure´es mene´es aupre`s de membres cle´s de
11 ONG internationales d’importance. Elle analyse en premier lieu les raisons qui,
selon les membres interroge´s, incitent les ONG a` s’inscrire a` la Charte. Les re´sultats
contribuent au de´bat qu’ont les chercheurs, a` la fois «the´oriciens de club» et
«tenants du constructivisme», sur les e´le´ments cle´s de la re´glementation be´ne´vole en
de´montrant que le comportement des ONG a` cet e´gard est principalement influence´
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par des normes. Elle cherche en second a` lieu a` de´couvrir dans quelle mesure les
personnes interroge´es croient que la Charte a effectivement rehausse´ le sens des
responsabilite´s de ses membres. Leurs re´ponses soulignent davantage la pertinence
des explications constructivistes du comportement des ONG et donnent lieu a` de
nombreuses recommandations politiques concernant l’orientation future de la
Charte. Elles incluent le besoin de renforcer le profil de la Charte parmi les inter-
venants et de multiplier les e´changes entre homologues.
Zusammenfassung Die Accountability Charter, d. h. die Charta zur Rechen-
schaftspflicht, der internationalen Nichtregierungsorganisationen ist die einzige
globale, sektoru¨bergreifende regulatorische Initiative fu¨r internationale NROs. Die
vorliegende Arbeit ist die erste unabha¨ngige Studie zu den Wahrnehmungen hin-
sichtlich der Effektivita¨t der Charta beruhend auf 26 ausfu¨hrlichen semi-struktu-
rierten Interviews mit wichtigen Personen aus 11 fu¨hrenden internationalen NROs.
Als erstes analysiert man, was die befragten Personen u¨ber die Motivationen der
NROs zum Charta-Beitritt denken. Die Ergebnisse tragen zur wissenschaftlichen
Debatte u¨ber die treibenden Kra¨fte fu¨r eine freiwillige Regulierung zwischen den
,,Anha¨ngern der Clubtheorie‘‘und den ,,Anha¨ngern des Konstruktivismus‘‘bei,
indem demonstriert wird, dass das Verhalten der NROs diesbezu¨glich prima¨r nor-
mengesteuert ist. Zweitens untersucht man, inwieweit die befragten Personen
glauben, dass die Charta effektiv die Verantwortlichkeit ihrer Mitglieder gesteigert
hat. Ihre Antworten unterstreichen weiter die Anwendbarkeit konstruktivistischer
Erkla¨rungen fu¨r das Verhalten von NROs und resultieren in mehreren politischen
Empfehlungen fu¨r die zuku¨nftige Richtung der Charta. Darin eingeschlossen ist, das
Profil der Charta fu¨r die Stakeholder zu scha¨rfen und die Mo¨glichkeiten fu¨r Peer-
Learning auszuweiten.
Resumen La Carta de Responsabilidad de las INGO es la u´nica iniciativa global
transectorial reguladora para las Organizaciones No Gubernamentales (NGO, por
sus siglas en ingle´s) internacionales. E´ste es el primer estudio independiente de
percepciones sobre su efectividad, basado en 26 entrevistas semiestructuradas en
profundidad con individuos claves de 11 NGO internacionales destacadas. En pri-
mer lugar, analiza las creencias de los entrevistados sobre las motivaciones de las
NGO para incorporarse a la Carta. Los hallazgos contribuyen al debate erudito sobre
los impulsores claves de la regulacio´n voluntaria entre ‘teo´ricos de club’ y ‘cons-
tructivistas’ demostrando que el comportamiento de las NGO en este sentido se guı´a
fundamentalmente por las normas. En segundo lugar, investiga en que´ medida creen
los entrevistados que la Carta ha sido efectiva para mejorar la responsabilidad de sus
miembros. Sus respuestas subrayan tambie´n la aplicabilidad de las explicaciones
constructivistas del comportamiento de las NGO, y llevan a varias recomendaciones
polı´ticas sobre la futura direccio´n de la Carta. Estas recomendaciones incluyen
elevar el perfil de la Carta entre las partes interesadas y ampliar las oportunidades
para el aprendizaje entre iguales.
Keywords Non-governmental organizations  Peer regulation  Self-regulation 
Voluntary regulation
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Peer regulation initiatives have proliferated over the last twenty years. This is partly
due to widespread recognition among non-governmental organizations (NGOs) that
they were vulnerable to attacks on their probity, and so there was a need for a
collective response. It has been estimated that there are as many as 350 regulatory
mechanisms for NGOs in existence (Lloyd et al. 2010). Yet, given the centrality of
accountability on the policy agenda, there is surprisingly little evidence of whether
peer regulation initiatives are actually effective. NGO peer regulation is a voluntary
form of regulation ‘whereby a sector level organization promotes common standards
of quality and accountability for NGOs’ (Crack 2016: 41). There are various alternate
terms for peer regulation initiatives, including ‘self-regulatory initiatives,’ or ‘quality
and accountability initiatives.’ The INGO (international NGO) Accountability
Charter1 (hereafter ‘the Charter’) is unique among peer regulation initiatives in that it
proclaims to be the ‘only global, cross-sectoral accountability framework for NGOs’
(INGO Accountability Charter n.d.). It had nineteen full members at the time of
writing, several of which are the most famous NGOs in the world, such as Amnesty
International, Greenpeace and Oxfam. Yet there has been no dedicated published
research on its impact. This article makes an initial contribution to addressing this
knowledge gap through in-depth, semi-structured interviews with twenty-six key
informants, including ten individuals who are central to the administration2 of the
Charter, and sixteen participants who have important responsibilities regarding the
Charter within their organizations. The latter group of participants was drawn from
eleven leading NGOs from the humanitarian, development and advocacy sectors.
Accountability for NGOs has been variously defined by scholars, NGOs and
standard-setting bodies over the years. Debates revolve around to whom and for
what NGOs should be held accountable (for an overview see Crack 2013). The
Charter defines accountability as follows:
• Being transparent on what the organization is, what it commits to doing and
progress achieved;
• Engaging key stakeholders in meaningful dialogue to enable continuous
improvement for those we serve;
• Using power responsibly and enabling stakeholders to hold us to account
effectively (INGO Accountability Charter 2015a).
The Charter stipulates a number of principles, guidelines and policies that
member organizations should observe in order to be deemed ‘accountable,’ and
members have to report annually against these commitments and publish the results
online. Many peer regulation initiatives are simply codes of conduct that require
little from their members other than a self-proclaimed commitment to the standards.
However, those with ‘global membership are less likely to have formal complaints
mechanisms and to punish rule violators than their regional and single-country
counterparts’ (Tremblay-Boire et al. 2016: 713) The Charter is notable for having a
1 ‘The INGO Accountability Charter changed its name after the time of writing to Accountable Now.’
2 I use the term ‘people involved with the administration of the Charter’ to encompass three categories of
participants: (a) representatives of the Charter Secretariat; (b) past/present members of the Charter Board;
c) past/present members of the Independent Review Panel. The term has been used where appropriate to
safeguard the identities of the participants.
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complaints mechanism, an independent vetting procedure, and a sanctions clause
that enables it to expel members that are non-compliant. It is therefore of interest
not only because of its cross-sectoral positioning and global membership, but also
because of its complaints and enforcement procedures.
The first question that this study addresses is: What do the interviewees believe
motivated NGOs to join the Charter? The key drivers behind peer regulation have
repeatedly been the subject of academic debate. The interviewees’ responses
provide the opportunity of exploring a puzzle in the literature: Why do NGOs
participate in regulatory initiatives? There are two main explanations: club theory
(which, put simply, argues that they do so for self-interested reasons, primarily to
send a reputational signal to stakeholders) and constructivist3 theory (which, put
equally simply, argues that NGOs are strongly influenced by shared beliefs about
accountability norms). The interview data suggest that both theoretical explanations
have some traction: Organizations maintain membership of the Charter to satisfy a
mixture of ‘self-interested’ and ‘norm-guided’ motivations.
The second question that this study addresses is: To what extent do the
interviewees believe that the Charter has been effective in enhancing the
accountability of its member organizations? The interviewees were asked to
evaluate the effectiveness4 of the Charter, based upon their experiences of engaging
with the reporting process and their understandings about changes in behavior and
performance of member organizations. The study finds that the interviewees believe
that the Charter provides NGOs with a defense against criticisms of poor
accountability from hostile parties, and also helps members to improve performance
through feedback and peer learning. However, they felt that the effectiveness of the
Charter was limited due to several factors, including poor awareness of the Charter
among key stakeholders, variable levels of engagement inside the member
organizations, and misaligned understandings of accountability between advo-
cacy/campaigning NGOs and humanitarian/development NGOs. I argue that their
critical appraisals of the Charter attest to the influence of both self-interested and
norm-based considerations.
The discussion proceeds as follows. The first section provides an overview of the
rise of NGO peer regulation and outlines the main contentions of club theory and
constructivist theory. The second section provides background information on the
Charter, and the third section explains the methodology of the study. The fourth
section explores the interviewees’ opinions on the motivations for NGOs joining the
Charter. The fifth and sixth sections turn to consider the perceived efficacy of the
Charter, which is discussed in terms of the benefits and challenges of Charter
membership. The concluding section offers some policy recommendations and
suggestions for future research.
3 ‘Constructivism’ is used here to refer to the school of thought in political science.
4 The purpose of this article is not to argue in favor of a particular definition of effectiveness that can be
used to evaluate the Charter, but rather to explore the interviewees’ perceptions of what constitutes
‘effectiveness’.
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Club Theory, Constructivism and Measures of Efficacy
It has become evident that there is a pressing need for NGOs to raise their standards
of accountability and to address perceptions that they are unaccountable (Schmitz
et al. 2012; Thrandardottir 2015). Accountability issues are now high on the NGO
policy agenda, particularly given that major donors attach more importance than
ever before to transparency and evidence of ‘value for money.’ It is against this
background that NGOs have cooperated to establish several peer regulation
initiatives in recent decades.
The topic of NGO regulation has attracted some interest from scholars, both
within a domestic (Bies 2010; Bloodgood et al. 2014; Gugerty 2008) and
international context (Brown 2008). The literature on the efficacy of peer regulation
is relatively scant, not least because of the challenges of finding a common measure
of effectiveness (Crack 2016; Featherstone 2013). The scholarship therefore focuses
on the factors underpinning the emergence and design of regulation mechanisms.
There are two main explanatory approaches in this regard: club theory and
constructivist theory.5
Club theory builds upon principal-agent theory, a political economy approach to
understand the problems that are posed when a principal contracts an agent to carry
out certain tasks in conditions where both parties may have competing interests and
asymmetrical information. The principal will have less information than the agent
and so will be uncertain about whether the agent is serving the principal’s best
interests, particularly when it is difficult for a principal to monitor the agent’s
actions and/or an agent will find it profitable to exploit the principal. There are all
manners of ways in which principals and agents might try to ameliorate these
problems—regulatory ‘clubs’ are but one. Clubs serve to provide a reputational
signal to principals. Agents may join regulatory clubs to improve their performance.
A strong signal is likely to be sent to principals if standards are stringent and
compliance is monitored. Membership can signify high levels of accountability and
performance if the club is widely regarded as credible. The voluminous literature on
clubs mainly focuses on the private sector (Cornes and Sandler 1996; Sandler and
Tschirhart 1997), but the perspective has also been used by nonprofit scholars
(Gugerty and Prakash 2010; Potoski and Prakash 2009; Prakash and Gugerty 2010).
NGOs have accountability relationships with multiple principals (donors, intended
beneficiaries, supporters, etc.), and clubs offer the potential to help NGOs to build
trust with these different stakeholders. Effective clubs prompt changes in NGO
behavior and open possibilities of receiving certain ‘rewards.’ NGOs may hope that
clubs could encourage donors to increase their funding. ‘[P]roactive voluntary
regulation might dampen the demand for new laws that restrict their activities in
even less desirable ways’ (Gugerty and Prakash 2010: 11). According to this
perspective, effective regulatory initiatives are ones that (a) have high levels of
compliance; (b) send a credible and widely recognized signal to principals in order
5 Compare with Obrecht’s discussion of an ‘economic approach’ versus an ‘institutional, norm-focused
approach’ (2012: 11).
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to build trust; (c) could lead to increased funding; (d) could help to preempt the
threat of government interference and/or regulation (see Table 1).
Distinct from this is the constructivist approach, which considers the influence of
shared ideas and values as key to understanding what shapes forms of regulation.
They acknowledge that self-interest may partly account for a NGO’s decision to join
a regulatory mechanism, but are also interested in how NGOs are incentivized by a
concern for shared norms, a desire to engage in social learning and to share best
practice. Deloffre, for example, accounts for the design of the regulatory initiatives
that were established after the Rwandan genocide as being shaped by debates among
NGOs and key stakeholders ‘that created a feeling of mutual engagement and
commitment to defining collective accountability practice’ (2016: 22). According to
this constructivist perspective, an effective regulatory initiative would be one that
shapes understandings about ‘rightful conduct’ for responsible NGOs among
practitioners and stakeholders. Such understandings may correlate with donor
expectations, but are not necessarily determined by the preferences of donors (Pallas
et al. 2014). For constructivists, ‘effective’ standards would help to produce an
institutional environment that promotes social learning and norm-compliant
behavior, by encouraging individuals to internalize and uphold the norms (see
Table 1).
Although club theory and constructivism have a different focus, they are not
mutually exclusive. The interpretations that each approach generates can be
compatible, and provide a nuanced and multidimensional account of actor behavior.
As will be seen, the interviewees’ opinions about the effectiveness of the Charter
revealed evidence of both self-interested and norm-guided behavior among member
organizations. The next section provides some background on the Charter, before
the discussion proceeds to data analysis.
INGO Accountability Charter: Structure and Objectives
The INGO Accountability Charter was established by a consortium of leading
NGOs and launched in 2008. It is funded by annual membership fees from NGOs.
Since 2010, it has been based upon the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI), which is
the world’s largest sustainability reporting framework. The GRI is used by
corporations and other organizations on a voluntary basis to report on their
performance. The Charter commissioned the GRI to produce a ‘NGO Sector
Supplement,’ a modified version of the guidelines designed to ‘enable NGOs to
demonstrably meet the same standards of transparency…that are demanded by other
sectors’ (Global Reporting Initiative 2011: 6).
The Charter consists of ten commitments that are intended to promote the goals
of ‘greater transparency, accountability and effectiveness’ (INGO Accountability
Charter 2015b). The commitments are summarized thematically in the Charter as
follows: respect for human rights; independence; transparency; good governance;
responsible advocacy; participation; diversity/inclusion; environmental responsibil-
ity; ethical fundraising; and professional management (INGO Accountability
Charter 2014a: 2). The Charter Text goes on delineate each theme in terms of
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specific undertakings. For example, the commitment to ‘good governance’ requires
NGOs to ensure, among other things, ‘publication of a clearly defined and
transparent mission, governance structure and decision-making process at the
governance level’ (ibid: 6).
Member organizations must produce an annual report to demonstrate that policies
and procedures are in place to promote adherence to the Charter. The report
framework consists of 36 ‘profile disclosures’ about the organization, and 20
‘performance indicators’ about program effectiveness, ethical fundraising and
communication, and management of issues concerning finance, the environment,
human resources and impact on wider society (INGO Accountability Charter
2014b). Members have to account for any failure to report against all the criteria.
The reports are submitted to an Independent Review Panel (IRP), which is
composed of ‘respected accountability experts’ (ibid: preamble). The IRP assesses
the strength of the evidence presented and indications of institutional commitment
to accountability in the reporting exercise. They provide targeted feedback, advising
on how the member’s reporting and/or performance should be improved.
Organizations are also encouraged to complete a ‘gap analysis’ exercise to identify
areas in need of improvement and to set self-imposed targets for change. The Panel
scrutinizes progress against these targets in forthcoming annual appraisals. The
documentation is made available on the Charter Web site.
Member organizations could be expelled if they are found to be in contravention
of the Charter commitments or if they fail to submit reports without sufficient
explanation. There are nineteen full members at the time of writing: ActionAid;
Amnesty International; Article 19; BRAC; Care; CBM; Civicus; Educo; European
Environmental Bureau; Greenpeace; Islamic Relief; Oxfam; Plan; Sightsavers; SOS
Children’s Villages International; Terre des Hommes; Transparency International;
World Vision and World YWCA.
Table 1 Drivers for peer regulation and measures of effectiveness
Perspective Drivers for peer regulation Measures of efficacy
Club theory Self-interested behavior
Organizations join to provide a
reputational signal to principals
NGOs are compliant
Widely recognized by principals as a
credible signal of quality
Increased trust from principals
Higher levels of funding from donors
Discourages unwanted government
interference and/or regulation
Constructivist
theory
Norm-guided behavior
Organizations join because of the influence
of shared norms about ‘rightful conduct’
for NGOs and a desire to engage in social
learning
Standards shape widely held notions of
‘rightful conduct’
Key actors internalize the norms
An institutional environment is created
that promotes social learning and norm-
compliant behavior
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Methodology
The findings are based upon semi-structured interviews with 26 participants, during
August–November 2014. Sixteen of these were participants from member NGOs
who were centrally involved in the decision to join the Charter and/or were closely
involved with producing reports for the Charter. They were speaking in a personal
capacity rather than on behalf of their organization. All of the relevant NGOs were
contacted with requests for interviews, and participants from 11 of the 186 ‘full
member’ organizations responded. Ten participants were involved with the
administration of the Charter, including five current/former Board members, four
current/former members of the Independent Review Panel (IRP) and a represen-
tative from the Charter Secretariat. Most respondents spoke on condition of
anonymity. The data should be treated with a degree of caution, since the views of
the participants may reflect their interest in appearing to uphold high standards of
transparency and accountability. Nonetheless, the participants did express signif-
icant reservations about the efficacy of the Charter, as shall be seen.
Data were manually sorted into a list of preset codes, derived from keywords
used in club theory (e.g., ‘reputation,’ ‘brand,’ ‘trust’) and constructivism (e.g.,
‘norms,’ ‘learning,’ ‘sharing’). Emergent codes were identified when analyzing the
data that enabled the capture of recurrent ideas and meanings. Two validation
strategies were adopted to improve the rigor of the study (Creswell 2008). Firstly, a
preliminary report of the prevailing themes was circulated to participants for
feedback. The quotations used in this article have all been approved by the
participants concerned. Secondly, claims made by the interviewees were corrob-
orated with document analysis. This included reports from the member organiza-
tions along with feedback from the IRP and responses to feedback from the NGO
where provided, the minutes from Charter AGMs 2011–2015; the Charter Annual
Report 2011–2014, as well as sundry materials relating to the membership criteria
and reporting requirements.
The following questions were posed to interviewees: (a) What motivates NGOs
to join the Charter? (b) What are the perceived benefits of being a member of the
Charter? (c) What are the perceived disadvantages of membership? (d) Bearing in
mind the benefits and challenges of membership that you have just described, to
what extent do you feel that the Charter is effective in enhancing the accountability
of member organizations? The responses to these questions are detailed below.
Motivations for Joining
All the participants agreed that the key incentive for joining the Charter is the
legitimacy it promises to bestow upon member organizations, given its self-
proclaimed status as the ‘only global, cross-sectoral accountability framework for
NGOs’ (INGO Accountability Charter 2015a). The high profile of the largest
6 Although there are 19 Charter members at the time of writing, there were only 18 at the time that the
research was conducted.
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member NGOs was acknowledged as a key factor underpinning the credibility of
the Charter and the attractiveness of membership to smaller NGOs. In the words of
one interviewee: ‘I think it helps your organization to build its brand, its reputation,
its acceptance by the public and by other constituencies including donors’ (Int.13).
It was seen as an additional advantage by some that the Charter is an initiative
driven by NGOs, rather than by donors, thus enabling NGOs to shape the
‘accountability agenda’ in a way that reflects common values and priorities across
the sectors. The interviewees were not specific about how the agenda might differ if
driven by donors.
Thirteen out of sixteen NGO participants admitted that joining the Charter was
partly a defensive move on behalf of their organizations to ward off actual and
anticipated criticisms of poor accountability from donors, the media and political
opponents. Joining the Charter was a way for NGOs to seize the initiative, because it
was feared that attacks on their integrity could gain traction if there was not a
concrete way to demonstrate their commitment to standards of excellence. To quote
an interviewee from Amnesty: ‘When we are questioned by government, for
instance, with questions about legitimacy and our accountability—particularly if
we’re pushing for greater accountability by government—there have been times
when we’ve been able to use our membership of the Accountability Charter to
strengthen our position and show how we are accountable’ (Int.1).
Therefore, a large part of the Charter’s appeal to member NGOs is the
‘insurance’ it provides against possible accusations of poor accountability. This is
despite the fact that, even by the Charter’s own admission, it has a low profile
among those parties that have an interest in holding organizations account-
able (INGO Accountability Charter 2014c: 9). For example, no major donors
stipulate Charter membership as a precondition of funding. The interviewees
generally acknowledged that the documentation on the Charter web site is rarely
accessed by external stakeholders. A participant involved in the administration of
the Charter argued that this did not detract from the value of the reporting exercise,
because the requirements of membership compel organizations to engage with
accountability issues and thus raise standards of performance:
The general public, quite frankly, are never going to sit and read those
reports… I would hope that the civil society department in DFID who are
actually giving out the massive amounts of money and so on would actually
look at them, but I’ve no idea whether they do or not. But I think the fact is
that they’re there, and that’s what’s important. And also the process that the
NGOs have to go through in order to put them there and to get that information
is important, because that in itself drives greater accountability and
transparency (Int.5).
None of the interviewees suggested that donors have a meaningful appreciation
of the Charter; even the Charter’s web site will only go so far to claim that it ‘has a
good chance of reaching donor recognition due to its unique positioning’ (INGO
Accountability Charter 2015a). All of the interviewees involved in the administra-
tion of the Charter spoke of the importance of increasing donor awareness of the
initiative in order to maintain its relevance to existing members and to enhance the
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attractiveness of membership to other organizations. These were sentiments that
were echoed by six participants from humanitarian/development NGOs and five
participants from advocacy/campaigning NGOs.
Club theorists contend that NGOs join regulatory initiatives to send a reputational
signal to principals (Connelly et al. 2011; Gugerty 2009; Prakash and Potoski 2006).
The Charter’s emphasis on reporting and compliance suggests that signaling is
important, especially given that the more rigorous GRI framework was incorporated
into the standards four years after the Charter’s launch. However, by this yardstick,
the Charter seemingly has little efficacy if crucial stakeholders such as donors have
poor awareness of its existence, which raises the question of why organizations have
continued to pay their membership dues for years. Some of the responses above
indicate that club theorists are correct to identify signaling as a key incentive,
particularly to evade unwelcome government interference, but the data also suggest
the presence of drivers other than self-interest. The following two sections turn to
consider the interviewees’ perceptions of the Charter’s efficacy after joining,
beginning with their assessments of the benefits of Charter membership.
Perceived Benefits of Membership and Reflections on the Charter’s
Efficacy
Thirteen out of the sixteen NGO participants identified peer learning opportunities
as one of the most valuable aspects of Charter membership. The Charter provides
formal occasions for knowledge exchange; for example, they run Webinars and Peer
Advice Groups on numerous accountability-related topics. Peer learning also
happens informally, such as networking outside of meetings. Indeed, two
interviewees stated that they found that formal and informal peer learning that
occurs at these events as more useful in developing their thinking about
accountability and performance than the actual exercise of compiling the Charter
report.
Six NGO respondents claimed that the high-quality feedback from the IRP was
one of the most significant benefits of Charter membership, and asserted that it has
led to substantive improvements in practice. It was possible to identify several
concrete examples of the influence of the Charter on policies of member
organizations. Perhaps the most significant is the introduction of a Complaints
Handling Mechanism, which has recently been made a prerequisite of Charter
membership (INGO Accountability Charter 2015c). For example, one interviewee
explained that an anonymous Web-based whistle-blower system had been
implemented within two years following feedback from the IRP: ‘We would have
probably gone into the direction of reviewing our anti-corruption policies at certain
stage, no question about it, but to actually boost and to really make that an urgent
matter—that is thanks to the expert panel’ (Int.9).
Several non-environmental NGOs have also taken measures to reduce their
carbon footprint in order to comply with the performance indicators on environ-
mental responsibility. For example, Oxfam International was commended by the
IRP for reducing its greenhouse gas emissions by 8.5% from 2010 to 2013 (INGO
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Accountability Charter 2015f: 96). Here, the value of the peer learning opportunities
that the Charter provides was in evidence, since some respondents particularly
singled out Greenpeace for praise in assisting other members to take issues of
environmental impact seriously. An interviewee from a humanitarian/development
NGO acknowledged that working with Greenpeace helped the organization develop
climate-sensitive policies, and claimed that they may not have embraced environ-
mental reporting without the impetus of Charter membership:
Basically nobody disagrees with this being the right thing, but in terms of
priority there are always so many things to be done… if you’re working as a
NGO with donations and you always have to, you know, justify 36 other top
priorities—it really helps if you also get this kind of external push to say, ok,
compared with best practice this is where you are behind (Int.9).
To summarize, participants felt that the channels for feedback helped to promote
internal learning, and Charter membership helps to maintain focus on obligations to
improve aspects of performance that might otherwise be side-tracked. It was said
that the impending deadline of the report helped to increase the urgency for changes
in practice.
These reflections suggest that a NGO’s decision to join a regulatory mechanism
may be partly motivated by self-interest (as club theory would predict) since there
was near consensus that NGOs were spurred to join the Charter to defend their
operational freedom. Club theorists could also argue that peer learning opportunities
are in the interest of NGOs, if it enables them to adopt better practices, increase
compliance and send a stronger reputational signal. However, there was general
agreement that the Charter has a low profile among key stakeholders such as donors.
None of the interviewees suggested that membership had helped them to retain/
increase their levels of funding. The interview data therefore present club theorists
with a problem: Why should NGOs participate in the Charter if, according to club
theory, its efficacy is limited?
The constructivist approach offers an alternative way to interpret the data (see
Table 1). There are indications of norm-guided behavior from the policy-making
level to the level of the individual staff member. There is evidence that membership
does provoke progressive reforms in policy and practice. It opens channels for more
informal and participatory forms of learning about best practice, and dialogue
between counterparts in different sectors that may not otherwise exist. The value
that the participants claim to attach to these interactions suggests that they have
internalized accountability norms. It presents a picture that accords with construc-
tivist predictions: NGOs join regulatory mechanisms because it is widely
understood to be an inherently ‘right’ thing to do. Efficacy is partly measured by
the extent to which the Charter has shaped the understandings of practitioners about
‘rightful conduct,’ and helped to foster an institutional environment that promotes
accountability norms. This could partly explain why NGOs abide by the Charter,
even though membership does not help them to transmit a widely recognized
reputational signal.
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The participants discussed the disadvantages of Charter membership, and the
responses further underlined the applicability of both theories to understanding key
drivers behind peer regulation.
Perceived Challenges of Membership and Reflections on the Charter’s
Efficacy
Club theorists would expect the participants to frame their criticisms of Charter in
terms of poor signaling to principals and membership costs. These themes were
indeed evident in the data. There was consensus among all participants that the
effectiveness of the Charter is impaired by its low profile among donors and within
the NGO community. Also, seven NGO participants complained about allocating
resources to meet the commitments of Charter membership (including six from
humanitarian/development organizations). The membership fee ranges from €1000
for NGOs with an annual income of less than €1 million to €25,000 for
organizations with an income of more than €1 billion (INGO Accountability Charter
2015c). The financial commitment extends to staff time devoted to compiling the
Charter reports. Participants expressed weariness with bureaucracy and concerns
about the time spent on potentially duplicating information for different internal and
external reporting frameworks. This was noted by one participant as particularly
problematic for humanitarian/development organizations that also seek to comply
with other regulatory initiatives. There are far more of these in the humanitarian/
development sector than the advocacy sector. Humanitarian/development organi-
zations also have to contend with stringent reporting requirements from donors.
Monitoring and evaluating impact, articulating theories of change and completing
log-frames have long been a core activity of their work.
The perceptions of NGO participants about the onerous nature of the reporting
requirements should be weighed against efforts by the Charter to reduce the
workload entailed by membership by streamlining the reporting process. The
recently revised Reporting Requirements state that reports should be a maximum of
40 pages long, and that the relevant information can be embedded in the
organization’s annual report (INGO Accountability Charter 2015d: 5). Further, once
an organization has achieved ‘a sufficient level of accountability, it only has to
submit full reports every two years’ and submit a 4–6-page report in the interim
(ibid: 2). The recent simplification of reporting requirements was universally
welcomed in the interviews. Nevertheless, for club theorists, the grumbles about the
resource-intensive nature of the reporting process would be expected since agents
have an interest in minimizing the ‘costs’ of regulation (or at least to the extent that
it does not compromise the credibility of the signal sent to principals).
Another prominent theme in the data was frustration with the low profile of the
Charter. NGO participants did not just complain that donors were hardly aware of
the Charter, but also that NGO staff were similarly under-informed. This is
particularly the case for NGOs with a large ‘family’ structure with many national
entities. The problem is exacerbated by high levels of staff turnover, which is
commonplace for NGOs and results in persistent problems with knowledge
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management. Respondents observed that it can be a challenging task to coordinate
data collection for the Charter from country offices and even more so given such
poor levels of awareness about the purpose of the exercise. Some expressed feelings
of disenchantment because so much time was invested in producing the reports, and
yet readership is very low, even within their own organizations. For one
interviewee, the low rate of access seriously compromised the value of the
reporting process:
You know, if only four people have read this, does this even remotely mean
accountability? Because there’s a presumption that when you’ve written it,
people are actually going to read it and take note of it. You know, asking the
questions might influence the way we do things internally, but you want
people externally to be reading and asking the questions, otherwise you think,
well, is this just a scheme for full employment? Are we all just writing reports
that no one else reads? (Int.7)
This desire to have an internal/external audience reveals that the participant
measures the efficacy of the Charter in terms of how well it performs a ‘signaling’
function, in line with the predictions of club theory. Furthermore, the Charter is
currently working on a Global Standard to ‘generate public trust and recognition,’
which indicates a common desire to signal even though these ambitions have not yet
been realized (INGO Accountability Charter 2015e).
Constructivist themes were also evident in the data. Although constructivists do
not deny the presence of self-interest, they focus attention on how actors evaluate
efficacy in terms of the extent to which regulatory mechanisms foster an
institutional environment that promotes norm-compliant behavior. Several inter-
viewees seemed to employ constructivist measures of efficacy by expressing
cynicism about the potential of the Charter to produce positive outcomes. Three
participants from humanitarian/development NGOs voiced skepticism over whether
any meaningful changes were implemented in their organization as a result of
feedback, and suggested that the report could be regarded as a bureaucratic exercise
rather than a real driver of change. Meaningful change, it was suggested, can only
occur when commitment to accountability is ‘embedded in the DNA of the
organization somewhere’; the Charter cannot deliver such a shift because it is ‘only
a reporting tool… and that’s all this I think is ever going to be’ (Int.7).
Other participants agreed about the importance of encouraging strong engage-
ment with the accountability agenda across the organization, and here the
commitment of senior leadership was seen as key. It was observed that the Charter
cannot hope to have more than limited effectiveness if accountability is not a
strategic priority. Jeremy Hobbs, former Chair of the Charter Board, confirmed that
the Board was aware of this problem: ‘So very often the CEO intellectually gets it,
but is not committed emotionally if you like. Or they are committed, but the next
layer of staff are not.’ The problem of uneven levels of commitment also happens in
reverse. The potential of the Charter to promote change could be neutralized if it is
seen as a ‘pet project’ of the CEO and little valued by staff at lower levels of the
organization, as exemplified by the following extract from an interview with a
participant from a humanitarian/development NGO: ‘At the moment the CEO says
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we do it, so we do it. But the trouble with that approach is you don’t get a very
consistent buy-in across the organization’ (Int.7). These candid remarks about
varying levels of reveal that actors will evaluate the efficacy of the Charter in terms
of the extent to which it fosters an environment that promotes norm internalization
and norm compliance, as constructivists would predict.
Constructivists would also expect that key actors would evaluate the Charter in
terms of how well the standards shape expectations of ‘rightful conduct.’ Normative
measures of efficacy were evident when interviewees complained of disconnect
between NGOs from different sectors regarding conceptions of accountability.
Participants from the advocacy/campaigning sector felt that conversations tend to
revolve around service delivery, to which their organizations cannot always
meaningfully contribute or learn from. In the words of Clare Doube, a member of
the Charter’s Board of Directors and the Director of Strategy and Evaluation at
Amnesty International: ‘Therefore, in terms of the experience sharing, peer learning
aspects, I feel we sometimes don’t gain as much as some of the conversations aren’t
really relevant for us.’ Such participants also felt that the discourse about
accountability that takes place under the aegis of the Charter is primarily framed
around the working model of humanitarian/development organizations. The
complex interplay between self-interested and normative concerns is illustrated
by the following quote from Janet Dalziell, the Director of Global Development at
Greenpeace International, and a member of the Charter’s Board of Directors: ‘I
really struggle with it because these concerns are so driven by the model that relies
on government funding—or other very large donors—and we at Greenpeace don’t
have any of that, and so it’s just irrelevant for us. It drives the conversation into a
very Northern-focused set of obsessions and worries and discussion that I find don’t
actually…help us….It has all the potential to really distract us from some more
overarching considerations about what accountability is and should be.’ The quote
reveals unease about the tension between sending signals to key stakeholders and
what the participant regards as ‘appropriate’ accountability practice. Moreover, it
illustrates how constructivism can supplement club theory by providing additional
dimensions to interpretations of actor behavior.
Some participants also observed that it is relatively easier for humanitarian/
development organizations to identify stakeholders than it is for advocacy
organizations. ‘Stakeholders,’ for humanitarian and development organizations,
tend to constitute a more sharply defined group of people—the users of a newly
constructed well, for example, or the borrowers in a micro-finance initiative.
Advocacy/campaigning organizations have a more difficult time in identifying and
justifying their key constituencies and evaluating the impact of their activities on the
lives of the people that they claim to represent. This gives rise to recurrent debates
about what it means to ‘do good,’ which are particularly tricky when NGOs claim to
work on behalf of constituencies who are ‘voiceless’ (e.g., animals, ‘future
generations’).
Tensions arising from competing notions of accountability are to be expected in
some degree in an initiative that attempts to articulate common standards across
different sectors, which is after all the unique selling point of the Charter. An
interviewee from a campaigning NGO reflected upon the problems involved in
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establishing a set of cross-sectoral standards that are suited for a wide diversity of
organizations and suggested that it could impact upon Charter recruitment:
I understand the need for standardization…but I would like to have seen
probably a little more openness to flexibility rather than what could be
interpreted as judgments based on a framework which works for probably
development but not necessarily for all organizations. And I think that
probably could be the reason why some organizations may not want to join,
because fear of being judged because they don’t fit into the reporting
requirements—but that doesn’t mean to say they’re less connected to
accountability than anybody else (Int.22).
In sum, the interviewees evaluated the challenges of membership using
rationalist and normative measures of efficacy—thus underlining the applicability
and complementarity of both club theory and constructivism in understanding the
drivers behind peer regulation. Participants offered reflections on a range of diverse
topics that included the integrity of the memberships’ involvement with the Charter.
Advocacy/campaigning organizations expressed theoretical and practical concerns
about the compatibility of certain accountability standards to their work. These
extracts revealed disquiet about the potential of signaling to sidetrack organizations
from engaging in normative debates about accountability. However, evidence of
self-interested behavior can be found in the complaints about poor signaling, the
cost of membership and the ‘burdensome’ requirements of reporting. Participants
measured the Charter’s efficacy both in terms of the extent to which it enables
organizations to ‘do accountability well,’ and to the extent that it serves their
interest in portraying members as credible and trustworthy.
Conclusion
The findings of this study are salient for academics and practitioners. For the former,
the interview data cast light on the club theory–constructivist debate about the key
drivers behind NGO peer regulation. For the latter, the participant’s views on the
efficacy of the Charter suggest several policy recommendations.
The first question that this study sought to address was: What do the interviewees
believe motivated NGOs to join the Charter? The interviewees’ interpretations of
what constituted ‘effectiveness’ were informed by their understanding of the
reasons why organizations submit to peer regulation.
The literature offers rival explanations for the drivers behind NGO behavior,
which are linked to distinct measures of efficacy. Club theory posits that members
join a regulatory mechanism to acquire an exclusive benefit: a signal of ‘virtue’ that
is communicated to important stakeholders. It predicts that informants would regard
a regulatory initiative as ‘effective’ if (a) NGOs are compliant; (b) it is widely
recognized as a signal of credibility and helps to build trust with principals; (c) it
could boost funding; (d) it could discourage governments from encroaching upon
NGOs’ operational freedom. The interview data suggests that club theory has some
purchase, since there was evidence of self-interested behavior. There was general
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agreement that organizations joined the Charter to demonstrate that they were being
proactive in improving their accountability, and to send a reputational signal to
donors. Moreover, the fact that the standards have been progressively strengthened
lends credibility to the interpretation of the Charter as a club.
Club theorists argue that agents can gain from positive ‘network effects’ from
club membership, resulting in enhanced standing with their principals (Prakash and
Potoski 2006: 33). It could be argued that if member NGOs gain from a generalized
perception that they are credible organizations, it may not matter if donors are
unaware of the specifics of the Charter. Voluntary regulatory activities may have an
indirect influence on principals, perhaps leading to, for example, increased funding.
Future research could test such a hypothesis by interviewing donors to establish how
funding decisions are made.
In contrast to club theorists, constructivists consider the influence of shared ideas,
norms and values as key to understanding what shapes forms of peer regulation.
They would predict that informants would regard a regulatory initiative as
‘effective’ if (a) it shaped shared expectations about ‘rightful conduct,’ (b) the
norms were internalized by key actors and (c) it helped to foster an institutional
environment that supported norm-compliant behavior. The interview data contained
themes that revolved around the integrity of the memberships’ involvement with the
Charter. There was little indication that the participants’ opinions about the efficacy
of the Charter were shaped by the presence or absence of financial ‘rewards,’ which
were not mentioned at all. Interviewees expressed their disappointment with the
poor recognition of the Charter inside and outside the organization and cautioned
that a reporting procedure could not deliver meaningful change alone. They stressed
the importance of organizational culture and of individual engagement with
accountability norms. They valued opportunities to learn from their peers. The
findings suggest that organizations participate in the Charter to satisfy a mixture of
‘self-interested’ and ‘norm-guided’ motivations.
The second question that this study sought to address has direct policy
significance: To what extent do the interviewees believe that the Charter has been
effective in enhancing the accountability of its member organizations? The
interviewees discussed three main benefits of Charter membership: Firstly, it
provides NGOs with a defense against actual or anticipated criticisms of poor
accountability from the media and political opponents. Secondly, membership
provides peer learning opportunities. Thirdly, the IRP provides high-quality
feedback that can be a useful impetus to boost standards of performance. The
interviewees also listed a series of challenges associated with Charter membership.
Concerns were raised that the low readership of the reports makes it problematic to
maintain ‘buy-in’ at all levels of the organization. Respondents from advo-
cacy/campaigning NGOs felt that Charter membership is more relevant to the
working model and concerns of humanitarian/development NGOs. Lastly, some
participants also perceived the reporting process as resource intensive, and several
cautioned of the danger that reporting becomes a bureaucratic exercise rather than a
real driver of change.
A number of policy recommendations arise from these findings. The Charter
company should invest further efforts into raising the profile of the initiative among
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stakeholders. It should also explore ways in which it can work with members to
raise awareness of the initiative among NGO staff. It should work closely with
advocacy/campaigning organizations to identify ways to enhance the relevance and
value of Charter membership to their work, and expand opportunities for members
to engage in peer learning. The Charter company has recently attempted to simplify
the reporting process by setting clear maximum limits on the amount of information
required—future research into this area might investigate whether these new
guidelines have helped to address perceptions that the process is overly
bureaucratic.
This study also has implications for peer regulation initiatives more generally.
Firstly, NGOs should consider more extensive consultation with their principals
about what constitutes an effective signal. It was notable that interviewees cited the
ability to shape the accountability agenda, free of donor influence, as a benefit of
Charter membership. However, they were also concerned that the Charter sent weak
signals because of its low profile. There seems to be some tension between their
desire for autonomy and their ambitions for greater recognition. If member
organizations want to signal that they are more credible than non-members,
principals should ideally not only know about the club, but also have faith in it. That
may be achieved by inviting principals to contribute to how verification and
certification mechanisms are designed. Creating a stronger signal serves the self-
interest of member organizations, and so the initiative will be more likely to be
perceived as effective in club theory terms.
However, regulatory mechanisms should also promote social learning if they are
to be perceived as effective by actors who are motivated by norm-guided, as well as
self-interested, considerations. Organizational learning is best achieved in a forum
where actors can admit to failures without fear of punishment (Crack 2013). This is
difficult to achieve within a regulatory initiative, as actors may be disinclined to
speak with candor if this will undermine the reputational signal sent to principals.
NGOs should explain to their stakeholders that owning up to failure can actually
improve accountability, as long as lessons are learned and shared with peers. The
willingness to disclose evidence of under-performance should be considered as a
sign of credibility as long as the club facilitates dialogue about the best practice. In
this way, the measures of efficacy employed by club theory and constructivists can
be better aligned.
This article is a starting point in addressing the knowledge gap about the
effectiveness of the Charter. It is a timely juncture for further research to be
conducted into the Charter as they inaugurate a ‘Global Standard for CSO
Accountability’ with other global networks and embrace an ambitious new strategy
to expand its membership (INGO Accountability Charter 2015e). Accountability is
a centrally important value for progressive NGOs, so it is in the interests of
practitioners and stakeholders to ensure that policy is designed in accordance with a
robust evidence base.
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